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Abstract
Economic theory predicts that in a ﬁrst-price auction with equal and observ-
able valuations, bidders earn zero proﬁts. Theory also predicts that if valuations
are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your val-
uation, bidders will bid less and earn positive proﬁts. Hence, rational players
in an auction game should prefer less public information. We are perhaps more
used to seeing these results in the equivalent Bertrand setting. In our exper-
imental auction, we ﬁnd that individuals without information on each other’s
valuations earn more proﬁts than those with common knowledge. Then, given
a choice between the two sets of rules, half the individuals still preferred to have
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Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero 
profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to 
bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits. Hence, rational players in an auction game 
should prefer less public information. We are perhaps more used to seeing these results in the equivalent 
Bertrand setting. In our experimental auction, we find that individuals without information on each other's 
valuations earn more profits than those with common knowledge. Then, given a choice between the two sets 
of rules, half the individuals still preferred to have the public information. We discuss possible explanations, 
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Abstract
Economic theory predicts that in a ﬁrst-price auction with equal
and observable valuations, bidders earn zero proﬁts. Theory also pre-
dicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is
weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn
positive proﬁts. Hence, rational players in an auction game should pre-
fer less public information. We are perhaps more used to seeing these
results in the equivalent Bertrand setting. In our experimental auc-
tion, we ﬁnd that individuals without information on each other’s val-
uations earn more proﬁts than those with common knowledge. Then,
given a choice between the two sets of rules, half the individuals still
preferred to have the public information. We discuss possible expla-
nations, including ambiguity aversion.
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11 Introduction
There has been a recent surge of interest in economics concerning the study of
diﬀerent information structures. Consider, for example, gurus and advisors in
the ﬁnance literature, cheap-talk and signaling in the game theory literature,
and incompleteness in the contracting literature. A fascinating observation
of the theory is that the value of information (to an informed party) can be
negative in a strategic setting. While in a one-person decision problem it is
necessarily the case that having more information increases one’s expected
payoﬀ (at least weakly), this result can fail in strategic settings. It can
be better to have strictly less information as long as the other players in
the game know that this is the case. While not altogether surprising, this
conclusion clearly runs counter to our standard intuitions about the value of
information. The purpose of this paper is to examine the public information
version of this result in a speciﬁc experimental setting, a ﬁrst-price auction
(equivalent to a Bertrand duopoly). We test whether information makes
players worse oﬀ, and then we investigate individuals’ preferences for the
revelation of information.
When economics students ﬁrst learn about Bertrand duopoly models,
they often question the unique Nash equilibrium prediction, which is for both
ﬁrms to price at cost and earn zero proﬁts1. Why not price somewhere above
cost (which weakly dominates pricing at cost) and potentially make positive
proﬁts, with no risk of a loss? It is a legitimate question, and although the
equilibrium stands, this illustrates the power of the assumption about com-
mon knowledge of other players’ payoﬀs in such games. The same question
appears in auction environments: if two bidders have the same value for the
1This assumes equal and observable constant marginal costs.
2good (and this is commonly known), then they will end up bidding exactly
that value. Under the more common assumption (mostly because it is theo-
retically more interesting) that values are not known, players bid below their
value and both bidders earn positive payoﬀs in expectation. It may seem
obvious in the auction setting that such common knowledge information is
harmful to proﬁts, but it is not always so transparent. Understanding sim-
ilar environments is important to ﬁrms (and more generally to any players
in these types of games), both when designing and inﬂuencing the institu-
tions in which they will operate, and when making actual decisions about
gathering and using information.
In this paper, we simulate a ﬁrst-price auction game (theoretically equiv-
alent to a unit-demand Bertrand oligopoly). By the logic above, subjects
playing such a game should do better when they do not know each other’s
valuations versus when they do. We ﬁnd that they earn higher proﬁts with
zero information, matching the theory, but that when asked their prefer-
ences, half of the participants choose to play in the environment with more
i n f o r m a t i o n . H e n c et h e yc h o o s et od e c r e a s et h e i re a r n i n g s . W ep r o p o s ea
hypothesis to reconcile this discrepancy: namely, that those particular sub-
jects are ambiguity-averse. Ambiguity is distinct from risk, and applies not
only when the state of the world is unknown, but also when the distribution
over states of the world is unknown. Curious individuals presumably are
averse to ambiguity since they seek information for the sake of information.
The Ellsberg Paradox (1961) is the typical example of ambiguity-aversion,
though it focuses solely on a decision-theoretic setting. Support for our hy-
pothesis comes from a survey in which a group of subjects answered questions
directly measuring ambiguity-aversion and their preferences for information
in strategic settings. We found a link in this case between those who were
3ambiguity-averse and those who wanted ‘detrimental’ information. Of course,
other explanations for the data are possible.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical back-
ground for the relevant auction theory, and Section 3 describes the relevant
prior experimental literature. Section 4 describes in more detail the experi-
ment conducted. Section 5 presents the experimental results, and Section 6
discusses the survey results and the ambiguity-aversion hypothesis. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
Auction theory is fairly well-developed for the familiar auction formats with
basic assumptions (see, for instance, Milgrom and Weber 1982). Recall that
a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction (FPA) is one in which bidders submit bids
simultaneously and secretly; the highest bidder wins the object and pays
his bid. Equilibrium bidding strategies involve bidding less than one’s val-
uation in order to capture some surplus. Exact strategies depend on the
expected distribution of the other bidders’ values and on bidder preferences
(e.g. risk-aversion). A second-price sealed-bid auction (SPA) is exactly the
same, except that the winning bidder pays the second-highest bid rather than
his own. Bidding one’s valuation exactly is the weakly dominant strategy.
The SPA is thus strategically equivalent to an English, or ascending-bid open
outcry, auction, where bidders drop out at exactly their valuation. Further-
more, the SPA is also outcome-equivalent to a ﬁrst-price auction in which
bidders know each others’ valuations (unlike above), since in that case the
bidder with the highest value will simply bid at or marginally above the
second-highest valuation.
4The classic result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem,
which states that these standard auction formats produce equivalent (and
optimal) expected revenue for the seller. Since they are all eﬃcient as well,
revenue equivalence from the seller’s perspective implies that they are also
cost equivalent for buyers. Revenue equivalence holds under the following
conditions: independent private values; symmetric prior distributions; and
risk neutrality of the bidders. We maintain the assumptions of private values
and symmetry, but we consider relaxing independence and risk neutrality.
In particular, if we drop independence and instead assume that values are
“aﬃliated” (loosely speaking, this requires positive correlation to hold locally
at every point in the support of the distribution), then the SPA produces
more revenue than the FPA. Note that the SPA is still strategically equivalent
(stronger than revenue equivalence) to the English auction here.
For our purposes, since we are speciﬁcally interested in information per
se,w er u no n l yﬁrst-price auctions, but in one case we inform players of each
other’s true values (‘CK’ for common knowledge) and in the other case we do
not (‘ZI’ for zero information). As noted above, the CK model is outcome-
equivalent to a SPA, while the ZI model is a FPA with no knowledge of the
prior distributions. This latter assumption is unusual (again because theory
has a limited amount that it can say concerning it), and one that we think
warrants further study in general. In any case, this allows us to apply the
theoretical results above to our settings. We point out formally here that a
FPA is identical to a Bertrand oligopoly model with undiﬀerentiated products
and inelastic unit demand, with the same possible information structures as
we have.
To summarize, and switching to the bidders’ point of view, buyers with
aﬃliated values (or similar marginal costs in the pricing game) should do bet-
5t e ri nt h eZ Im o d e lt h a ni nt h eC Km o d e l .I fi n s t e a dw ed r o pr i s kn e u t r a l i t y
and assume risk aversion (but restrict the model again to independent val-
u e s ) ,w eg e tt h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect: the FPA is better for the seller than the SPA,
and thus CK bidders should obtain more surplus than ZI bidders. In fact,
CK bidders may be even better oﬀ than SPA bidders under risk-aversion,
since now all aspects of the model are known with certainty. If we put these
two counter-balancing eﬀects together, the ultimate sign is theoretically am-
biguous.
3 Experimental Auction Literature
For a survey of the vast and ever-expanding experimental work on auctions,
see the book chapter by Kagel (1995). One of the main experimental re-
sults is that revenue equivalence does not seem to hold. More precisely,
English auctions tend to converge quite quickly to the equilibrium outcome
in repeated games, but there is systematic over-bidding in both ﬁrst-price
and second-price auctions (though it is considerably more pronounced in the
SPA). Thus prices are higher in SPAs than they are in English auctions, so
even strategic equivalence breaks down. Risk-aversion might help explain
overbidding in the FPA, but nothing can explain overbidding in the SPA
within the framework of the standard assumptions.
Experimental work has not focused yet either on the full ZI case (no
information even about distributions of values) or on the full CK case (which
is trivial theoretically). The case of aﬃliated private values has been studied
by Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987). Under risk neutrality, theory predicts
that FPA prices should be lower than SPA prices, but risk aversion makes
the eﬀect ambiguous. Kagel et al ﬁnd that Nash equilibrium does a good
6job of organizing the data in the FPA, and ﬁnd overall that seller revenue
f r o mt h et w of o r m a t si sa b o u tt h es a m e .T h e yﬁnd that public information
about others’ valuations does increase prices, but not by as much as would be
predicted in a risk-neutral Nash equilibrium. Of course, our CK setting is not
actually the same as a SPA experimentally, but that is certainly the closest
environment that has been studied and we expect similar comparative statics
relative to the FPA (our ZI). Kagel and Levin (1986) study public information
in a common value envrionment, and ﬁnd a mixed eﬀect: it increases bids
if there are few (3-4) bidders, but decreases bids with larger numbers (6-7)
because it weakens a prevalent winner’s curse bid error.
Few experiments have studied Bertrand competition directly. In the clos-
est analogous environment (“posted-oﬀers”; see Holt 1995), the data sup-
port the Nash equilibrium outcome rather than the competitive outcome
(Ketcham, Smith, and Williams 1984). Although theoretical auction predic-
tions are not entirely borne out by experiments, there are empirical regulari-
ties. For instance, risk aversion appears to be present to some extent. Given
risk aversion, aﬃliation moves revenue in the direction that theory predicts.
Overall, Nash equilibrium appears to match the data more successfully than
any simple ad hoc alternate models, however intuitively pleasing.
4T h e E x p e r i m e n t
The experiment was conducted over three days with 246 undergraduate stu-
dents at the University of Natal in Durban, South Africa. The game was a
simple two-player, sealed-bid, ﬁrst-price auction. Each subject was given a
valuation and was told that if they won the auction for less than this valu-
ation, they could keep the diﬀerence. Typically 30 students played at once,
7in 15 randomly assigned pairs. They did not know, nor could they learn, the
identity of their partner. The pairs were divided randomly into two groups,
the common knowledge (CK) group and the zero information (ZI) group.
T h o s ei nt h ec o m m o nk n o w l e d g eg r o u phad complete information (i.e.
they were told their opponent’s valuation as well as their own), and this
itself was also known to the participants. Those in the zero information group
knew only their own valuation and did not know that of their opponent (nor
were they told a distribution). The auction was conducted eight times (with
the same opponent) in each of the two bidding stages of the experiment.
Players were told whether or not they had won each auction before choosing
their subsequent bid, but they were not told their opponent’s bid. With 15
pairs in the room, randomly assigned, and the only public announcement
being whether a particular ID number won or lost, the possibility for explicit
or implicit communication suﬃcient to accomplish any collusion was close to
nil2.
In each bidding stage, the valuations for all eight rounds were revealed
to the players at the start of the ﬁrst round. In four of the eight rounds,
the two players had identical valuations. In two of the eight, the ﬁrst player
h a das l i g h t l yh i g h e rv a l u a t i o nt h a nt h es e c o n d ,a n di nt w ot h es e c o n dh a d
a higher valuations than the ﬁrst. Thus the CK subjects could see that
valuations were very strongly aﬃliated, but would not assume in the future
that they were identical. At the end of the eight rounds, we then asked
each player to choose between the two sets of rules (until this point they
did not know that there were two types of rules). The players had not yet
experienced both sets of rules (and we speciﬁcally wanted to avoid the eﬀects
2Furthermore, we saw no evidence of any such attempts. The few low, outlier bidders
seemed more confused by the whole game rather than sophisticated enough to attempt to
devise a signal to their partner.
8of learning; see discussion in the conclusion), but were told explicitly the full
distinction and had no trouble forming an opinion.
Stratifying by their stated preference so that half of the players received
their preferred rules (CK or ZI) and half did not, individuals were reassigned
to new pairs. Although we did not tell players either that they would receive
their choice of rules or that it would be random, they inferred that they would
get what they had asked for, so the responses are legitimate preferences. We
then played eight more rounds under the new rules. After this second stage,
we again asked subjects what their preference would be (CK or ZI). Of course,
this data is arguably less meaningful since the subjects did not have the same
incentives at this point. See Appendix for sample instruction sheets.
The monetary stakes involved were signiﬁcant for these players3.A v e r a g e
winnings were $5.50, and maximum winnings were $30. All students were
given a $2 showup fee. A typical daily wage for a college student in Durban is
$15. The games were conducted, and all results are reported, in Rand4.W e
also collected some demographic and other relevant data. For demographic
data, we collected university major, age, grade point average and race. Also,
before each stage of the game, we asked players to predict how well they
would do, both nominally and relative to others in the room.
3In prior studies with other experimental economic games, changing the size of the
stakes does change behavior in the game. See Cameron [1999].
4The exchange rate at the time of the games was 7.80 Rand to US$1.00.
95T h e E x p e r i m e n t R e s u l t s
5.1 Basic Results
In each round of the ﬁrst stage, the zero information players won on average
1.179 Rand (~1.5% of the average bid) more than the common knowledge
players, ﬁtting the prediction that with aﬃliated values, the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion is better for the buyer than a second-price auction. Likewise, the average
bid was 2.928 Rand lower for ZI than for CK players (see Table I, columns 1
and 2). Both of these results are signiﬁcant at the 99% level. In the second
stage, ZI players do worse than CK players, but the result is not signiﬁcant
statistically (see Table I, columns 4 and 7).
Those who had CK in stage one perhaps remembered that prices were
highly aﬃliated, and hence still played like CKs (i.e. knew that they had to
bid near their value to have any chance of winning) even if they were a ZI in
stage two. This could explain the lack of statistical signiﬁcance in the second
stage. Three pieces of evidence support this explanation. First, those who
had ZI in stage one do better in stage two, signiﬁcant at 95%, regardless of
whether they are CK or ZI in stage two (Table 1, column 3 and 6). Second,
those who were ZI in both stages do better, signiﬁcant at 99% (Table 1,
column 5 and 8). These results suggest that the CKs learned, and did not
forget, that winning bids must be at or very near their maximum allowable
bids. Last, we examine those who had ZI in stage two and CK in stage one. If
these individuals “learned” the game in stage one under CK, then when given
ZI in stage two they would assume that prices were highly aﬃliated, even
though they actually had no direct information on their opponent’s valuation.
T h e n ,i ft h i sp e r s o np l a y e da g a i n s ts o m e o n ew h oh a dZ Ii ns t a g eo n e( a n d
thus never saw any valuations other than his or her own), the former CK
10player should presumably bid higher and win the auction more often. That
is what happens: Table 4, Column 2 shows that when such a player played
against someone who had ZI in stage one, the average winnings were 2.022,
whereas when playing against someone who had CK in stage one, the average
winnings were 1.182. The diﬀerence between these results is signiﬁcant at
99%.
Table 2 presents the results broken down by round within each stage. We
examine here whether convergence is faster under CK or ZI. The dummies
for the later rounds are signiﬁcant and negative, showing that convergence
occurs. However, the dummies for the later rounds, interacted with a dummy
for CK, are positive but consistently insigniﬁcant, indicating no statistically
observable diﬀerential rate of convergence for ZI versus CK.
5.2 Preferences
After stage one, we asked each individual to choose which set of rules they
would prefer in stage two. Out of 246 individuals, 116 (47%) chose CK
(the theoretically ‘wrong’ decision). Table three analyzes the determinants
of these preferences. First, note that there is a signiﬁcant status quo bias:
those who had CK prefer CK and those who had ZI prefer ZI. Furthermore,
there is strong evidence for reinforcement as well (though only involving the
potentially less reliable second set of choices). Table 4 shows that individuals
were swayed by their personal experience with the two methods. 107 individ-
uals experienced both rules, and of those 62 did better with ZI and the other
45 did better with CK. Of those who did better under CK, 73% preferred
CK after both stages. Of those who did better under ZI, 68% preferred ZI
after both stages.
11One possible reason for choosing CK is if a player simply preferred not to
think (was ‘thought-averse’!) and found it easier to make choices with more
information even if this eventually led to lower proﬁts.5 Another explanation
is that individuals did not understand the games and picked something simply
because they were asked to make a choice. However, we asked individuals
how strongly they preferred the option they chose, and in only one case
for CK and one case for ZI did someone answer that they “barely prefer”
the option chosen. The modal answer was that they “strongly” preferred
the option chosen. There is some learning, as well, which suggests that
perhaps if repeated enough and participants were able to collect enough
data to update their prior intuition, they might switch their preferences from
common knowledge to zero information. We do ﬁnd that when individuals
play under both sets of rules, they tend to prefer the setting under which
they won more. This ﬁnding is weak, however, as the sample size is limited
a n di ti sa l s oc o m p l i c a t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h o s ew h op l a y e dZ Ia f t e rC K
potentially remembered that values were aﬃliated (and hence did not truly
experience ZI).
Ambiguity aversion is another possible explanation of the preference for
CK over ZI. With full information, the game is more concrete and the
player has a clearer sense of what their strategy should be. In Section 6
we present results from a later survey to test whether preferences for CK
over ZI are correlated with ambiguity aversion as typically measured using
decision-theoretic urn questions.
5This hypothesis is weakly supported by the observation that those players who tend
to bid amounts ending in 5 or 10 are more likely to prefer CK (signiﬁcant at 90% for stage
1 and 99% for stage 2; see Table 3). Under this line of reasoning, bidding relatively round
n u m b e r sr e q u i r e sl e s st h o u g h t .
125.3 Predictions and Overconﬁdence
We also asked each person to predict their winnings, the number of rounds
they would win, and their ranking out of a hypothetical 100 fellow students.
We examine whether individuals are overconﬁdent, and whether the overcon-
ﬁdence is correlated with a preference for CK or ZI. The median predicted
rank was the 70th percentile, the median predicted number of rounds won was
5 not 4 (8 rounds total), and the median predicted winnings were 50 rands
whereas the median actual winnings were 20 rands. Hence, as expected, the
median subject was overconﬁdent. Table 3 shows that there is no correlation
between an individual’s predicted winnings and actual winnings (column 6),
but there is a positive correlation, signiﬁcant at 95%, between an individ-
ual’s predicted number of rounds won and actual number of rounds won. This
could be because the participant knew beforehand whether they intended to
bid close or far from their valuations. We created a measure for overconﬁ-
dence by subtracting the actual number of rounds won from the predicted
number of rounds won. The more overconﬁdent someone is, the less likely
t h e ya r et op r e f e rC Ko v e rZ Ia f t e rs t a g e1 ,w h i c hi sh o w e v e rs i g n i ﬁcant at
only 90% (Table 3, Column 2). For stage 2, this result is not signiﬁcant
statistically (Table 3, Column 4).
6 Survey Results and Ambiguity Aversion
One possible reason that subjects chose the generally less proﬁtable environ-
ment (i.e. CK) is that they place some inherent value on information per
se, regardless of the implications for their payoﬀs. This can be formalized
in the notion of ambiguity-aversion. Ambiguity was deﬁned (ambiguously)
by Frisch and Baron (1988) to be “uncertainty about probability, created by
13missing information that is relevant and could be known”, while Camerer
(1995) put it even more succinctly: “known-to-be-missing information”. In
essence, ambiguity aversion goes one step beyond risk aversion6,a n di ns o
doing poses a challenge for subjective expected utility theory (Savage 1954).
In a certain world, the state is known. In a risky world, the state is unknown
but the probability of each state is known. In an ambiguous world, not only
is the state unknown, but so is the distribution over states; possibly there are
known probabilities for various distributions (‘second-order’ riskiness), but
possibly not (e.g. no information at all).
The canonical thought-experiment dealing with ambiguity aversion is the
Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg 1961), one form of which is as follows: Urn 1
has 50 red marbles and 50 black marbles, for a total of 100. Urn 2 has 100
marbles that are either red or black, in some unknown distribution. One
marble is chosen at random and the participant wins if red is picked. The
subject chooses from which urn to draw. Ambiguity aversion predicts that
the participant will prefer Urn 1, with a well-deﬁned probability of winning
of 50%. Furthermore, if the odds in Urn 1 are decreased, to 45% or even
to 40%, many participants will still prefer the smaller but known proba-
bility for Urn 1 to the ambiguous probability of winning for Urn 2. Many
decision-theoretic models have attempted to capture some aspects of ambigu-
ity aversion, e.g. maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) and
non-additive models (Schmeidler 1989 is one of several). Applications have
been equally far-ranging, from ﬁnance to health to incomplete contracts. Of
course, our auction game has more than one player, and less work has been
done on understanding ambiguity aversion in strategic settings.
6Sometimes ambiguity aversion is referred to as second-order risk aversion, as in, pref-
erences over distributions of distributions.
14Ellsberg’s original paper (1961) presented his now-famous paradox as a
thought-experiment only, but his intuition has been validated by many ex-
periments since then7. These studies ﬁnd that subjects are indeed averse to
ambiguity and are willing to pay an ‘ambiguity premium’ of roughly 10-20%
in order to avoid it. This aversion is not a ‘mistake’ or lack of understand-
ing of the question: Slovic and Tversky (1974) show that the result persists
even after explaining the phenomenon to subjects. One interesting inter-
pretation suggested by the work of Heath and Tversky (1991) is based on
competence: expertise in the area of the ambiguous gamble tends to reduce
ambiguity aversion (controlling for the level of ambiguity). This may help to
explain (see Blank 1991) why single-blind papers submitted to the AER are
accepted more frequently (14.1%) than double-blind papers are (10.6%)! It
also has potential implications for ambiguity aversion in interactive settings
with diﬀerent perceived player skill levels.
In a world with ambiguity aversion, there can be a demand for information
even if it is not going to aﬀect the decisions that are made (i.e. simply for its
own sake). For example, in medicine patients often want to know more about
their conditions, but they do not want to make more decisions themselves:
Strull, Lo, and Charles (1984) ﬁnd that tests are often ordered that do not
aﬀect either the diagnosis or the treatment. Still, little work has previously
been done directly on the relationship between ambiguity and information.
To map our experimental results to ambiguity aversion, we conducted
a simple survey of 169 students at Northwestern University. The students
were asked three standard urn questions (as described above) to identify those
who were averse to ambiguity in a decision-theoretic setting. In a separate
7See Camerer and Weber (1992) for an overview of the laboratory studies of ambiguity
aversion.
15question, the participants were asked to choose between the two auction rules
described previously (CK or ZI), exactly as the students in South Africa had
done. This survey is included in the Appendix. We identify an individual as
averse to ambiguity if the individual preferred Urn 1 (the one with a known
distribution) in all three urn questions.
Of the 169 respondents, 30 individuals were identiﬁed as ambiguity averse,
and 80% of those preferred auction rules with common knowledge of values.
Of the other 139 individuals, only 64% preferred auction rules with common
knowledge. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level. We
also asked the individuals to choose whether they would share information
with a competitor in a Bertrand competition pricing problem. Answers to
the auction and pricing questions were correlated (0.176, signiﬁcant at 95%
statistical conﬁdence). Furthermore, individuals identiﬁed as averse to am-
biguity in the urn questions were more likely to want full information in the
Bertrand competition price-setting question, but this result is not signiﬁcant
statistically (p=0.80). The link between ambiguity aversion and preference
for information in settings where it may be materially harmful supports our
hypothesis that ambiguity aversion partially explains the high percentage of
players in our original game preferring the CK setting. Of course, this evi-
dence is only circumstantial and other explanations cannot be ruled out as
discussed above.
7C o n c l u s i o n
T h ef a c tt h a ti n f o r m a t i o nc a nh a v ean e g a t i v ev a l u ei nas t r a t e g i cs e t t i n gi s
well known, at least to economists. That is, it is sometimes the case that all
players, if they behave optimally, would prefer less information on the table.
16In fact, it is possible that one player might individually prefer to have less in-
formation, as long as that fact is known to the other players. In this paper we
explore a particular variant of this phenomenon experimentally. Speciﬁcally,
in an auction game for which both players should theoretically prefer that
private valuations not be common knowledge, we ﬁnd experimentally that
the players do earn higher proﬁts without the information, but that many of
them choose to have the information anyway. So the theory is conﬁrmed, but
e i t h e rt h ep l a y e r sd on o tr e a l i z et h i so rt h e yh a v es o m er e a s o nt op r e f e rt h e
setting in which they enjoy lower proﬁts. We suggest, as one possibility, that
ambiguity aversion explains this preference, and we provide evidence from a
survey that shows a correlation between ambiguity aversion and preference
for full information in the competitive auction setting. Future experimen-
tal work may be able to better diﬀerentiate this rationale from competing
hypotheses.
As far as the speciﬁc assumptions of our experimental model go, there
are several limitations that we face. Our zero information framework gives
the players no information about their rivals because we wanted the most ex-
treme possible distinction from the public information case. With, say, some
information about distributions (the standard assumption), results should
fall somewhere in between the two. In the same vein, we were not interested
in learning, which would confound knowledge of the distributions with pure
preferences over the two environments. Finally, our ranking of the two possi-
bilities only holds theoretically with aﬃliated values. Certainly, a bidder who
values the object considerably more than his rival may wish to know that in
a ﬁrst-price auction. We consider only the former environment, though we
expect it to be empirically more relevant in the majority of cases.
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